As the 2017 playoffs begin to crank up in earnest, the St Louis Cardinals will be relegated to watching. A proud franchise who – not too long ago played in four consecutive Championship Series – will be bristling over their second straight exclusion from the post-season dance.
All over Cardinal Nation, a host of voices will be raised to give guidance and counsel to the St Louis management. I understand that mine will be a lonely voice, lost – no doubt – amidst the throngs clamoring for truckloads of money to be thrown at some high profile free agent or other. I am not terribly concerned about these voices, because (usually) Cardinal management has a much clearer grasp on the needs of their team than the common fan.
This year, however, from their early comments I am concerned that John Mozeliak and his councilors may have missed the many loud messages that his team has been sending him. So, as I acknowledge the fact that my singular plea for reason is liable to vanish into the great void of the blogosphere, I will nonetheless send forth my diagnosis of the club’s current issues and – as far as I am able – to at least hint at some sensible prescriptions.
It is important to note that none of this is as cut and dried as most fans (and bloggers) seem to think. Contrary to many opinions, giving Miami whatever they want for Giancarlo Stanton is not really a prescription for success, either in 2018 or beyond.
This is, in fact, both a critical and challenging offseason. St Louis has a handful of gifted players who must be added to the 40-man roster or be lost. They, therefore, will be challenged with making critical decisions about the futures of the players already on that roster. In many of these cases, the cases for and against these players is anything but clear. The organizational challenge is to be right in deciding which young talents to embrace and which to part with.
None of this will be easy at all, as I will attempt to point out.
First Off, This is a Team in Transition
Most followers of the Cardinals are already aware that this team is transitioning from the veterans of the teams that went to all of those championship series. For years, the organization has been stockpiling talent throughout its minor league system. Now, that rich resource is beginning to re-shape the major league team.
Twenty-three percent of all plate appearances taken by the 2017 Cardinals belonged to players who opened the season in Memphis. That percentage rose to 34% in the second half. The pitching staff was less influenced, but still 16% of the innings pitched came from Memphis arms. That figure also rose to 25% in the second half.
Make no mistake. The youth movement is underway. There had been similar displacement the year before, with the emergences of Aledmys Diaz and Alex Reyes. St Louis is clearly rebuilding, and trying to remain competitive while doing so.
The answer to getting this team back into the playoffs – for all of the rebuilding – is actually comparatively simple. They need to guess correctly on a closer.
Get Thyself a Closer
For as uneven as the Cardinals have been the last two years, they would have made the playoffs both years if they could have successfully filled one position – the closer. With more stability in the ninth inning, this teams could easily have made up the one game they lacked in 2016 and the four they fell short of this year. Cardinal pitchers appearing as closers finished 2017 with a 3.75 ERA – the worst showing for Cardinal closers since the fourth-place 2008 team finished with a 6.27 ERA from its closers.
It has become axiomatic throughout baseball – probably on all levels. If you don’t pitch the ninth, you will not succeed. This organization believed it had the ninth inning covered at the start of both of the last two seasons. They had no reasons to anticipate the struggles Trevor Rosenthal would have in 2016 or the problems that Seung-hwan Oh would run into this year.
Swing the net out to include the eighth inning, and the story becomes even more compelling. They lost 6 games this year when leading after 7 innings. Even more telling, in games the Cards were tied after 7 innings, they were only 3-12 – by percentage the worst performance by a Cardinal team in this century
But the Cardinals already know they have bullpen issues. And solving the eighth and ninth innings may well get them back into the playoffs, but won’t address the issues that will keep them from advancing once there.
It’s from this point on that I don’t think the organization is seeing clearly.
The Magical Impact Bat?
Among the primary targets this offseason, an “impact bat” seems to be high on the list. Really? Oh, don’t get me wrong. I wouldn’t mind seeing an established bat in the middle of the lineup. But who? And at what cost.
The least intrusive path would be free agency. But who would that be? J.D. Martinez is probably the most established of the free-agents to be. Would he come to St Louis? Given the Cardinals’ track record of wooing elite free agents (not to mention the spacious ballpark), I’ll have to remain skeptical on this one.
What concerns me most is that they will go out and trade a whole bunch of promising players for a slightly upgraded version of Brandon Moss. Is Josh Donaldson, for example, really worth surrendering the future of an Alex Reyes or a Sandy Alcantara? Are you really sure we don’t already have that impact bat? Can you say for certainty that the three-four-five spots in the Cardinal order come next July (or perhaps even June) won’t be Paul DeJong, Patrick Wisdom and Tyler O’Neill? Look at some of the players on the team this year that got less than full-time at bats.
DeJong hit 25 home runs in 417 at bats. Give him 500 at bats (around the norm for a starter) and Paul would have been a 30 home run man with a .285/.325/.532 batting line. And he was a rookie this year. There is a fairly good chance we haven’t seen the best of Paul yet.
Tommy Pham only made 128 starts, but finished with 23 home runs and a .306/.411/.520 batting line. A .931 OPS sounds pretty “impact” to me.
Jose Martinez got only 272 at bats, but hit 14 home runs. That would project to 26 home runs in a 500 at bat season to go along with his .309/.379/.518 batting line. Are we really, truly sure that Jose couldn’t be a fulltime player.
Moreover, I think the “impact bat” is an over-rated concept, unless you’re running a Whitey-ball offense and your lineup is 7 jack-rabbits and one bopper. Far more important is the depth of the lineup.
Consider: in the offensively unimpressive first half, four of the eight Cardinal batsmen with the most plate appearances hit below .250. Dexter Fowler finished at .248, Stephen Piscotty hit .240, Matt Carpenter scuffled in at .237, and Randal Grichuk hit the break at .215. That’s a lot of outs sprinkled regularly through the lineup. A “bopper” in the middle would certainly help, but with that many struggling bats, one “impact bat” won’t cure the problem.
Now consider: for the 44 games from August 6 through September 23, St Louis averaged 5.77 runs per game – an adequate offensive production, by anyone’s standard. During that span – of the eight players getting the most plate appearances – only Carpenter (.244) was under .250 – and that just barely. Nobody hit more than the 9 home runs that came off the bat of DeJong, but almost everybody hit some. Most importantly, they weren’t making outs. In almost all cases, a deep lineup is better for your offense than a concentrated one.
There is considerable pressure in the team to do something dramatic to push the team back into the playoffs. Again, I am just one voice. But if I had one of the best farm systems in baseball, I would trust it more. I would give this system every opportunity to prove to me that the pieces I need are already at my disposal. I’m not saying never trade from any of this surplus. But I am saying don’t trade the future for a mess of pottage (no offense, Josh).
Wither Lance Lynn
In this post, I made most of my case for keeping Lance Lynn. Since one of the comments made by the brain trust had something to do with shoring up the rotation (a goal I approve of), I have to wonder where they think they will get better value than Lance? Remembering that he was in his first year coming off elbow reconstruction (the infamous Tommy John surgery), Lance’s 33 starts, 17 quality starts, 186.1 innings pitched and 3.43 ERA are quite impressive.
More than the numbers, though, Lance was a bulldog. He even got hit in the head with a line drive and kept on pitching. As the next generation of pitchers graduate to the majors, Lance would be a terrific mentor.
Yes, he faded at the end – which was disappointing. Still, I am not at all convinced that, for the money and the years it would take to sign Lynn, they will find a better bargain out there.
Here’s a final note. In a down year for free-agent pitchers, Lance will be a likely target for a certain division rival who is always scrambling for pitching. He would be just what the doctor ordered for them.
My prediction here is that if they let Lance walk, they will regret it.
These are all important considerations, but the single most important failing of the 2017 team is one that I don’t think they are even aware of.
A Matter of Character
Throughout the course of the entire season, manager Mike Matheny would intone sentiments similar to this: time and time again, this team has shown me its character and its toughness; one thing I will never ever doubt is the toughness and character of this team.
The character of the team and its much-envied clubhouse was the foundation upon which the belief in the Cardinals’ eventual triumph was forged. It is organizational bedrock. The foundational doctrine upon which all decisions are based.
And it’s complete mythology.
In every way possible, the 2017 Cardinals tried to send this message to their manager’s office – and to their front office, too for that matter. Character wins were almost non-existent in 2017.
They were 4-7 in walk-off victories, 5-9 in extra-innings, 24-29 in one-run games. And two measures that I am fond of as revealers of character: they were 39-39 after losing their previous game, and 27-44 against teams with winning records – including losing 6 of their last 7 must-win games against Chicago.
As a point of reference, the 39-39 in games after a loss is the worst record for a Cardinal team in this century. The 2007 team that finished 78-84 was 43-41 after a loss. The 2006 team that snuck into the playoffs and won the whole thing after an 83-78 regular season was 43-40 after a loss (counting the playoffs).
By contrast, the 100-win 2005 team went 50-15 after a loss (counting the playoffs). In fact, the three 100-win versions in this century (2004, 2005, 2015) combined to go 128-65 (.663) after losing their previous game. There have been seven 90-win teams in this century so far. After losing their previous game, those teams have combined to go 301-209 (.591). There have also been seven 80-win teams in St Louis in this century. Even they have managed to go 294-251 (.539) in games after a loss.
The utility of this metric is that it reveals precisely one of the principle failings of this year’s club – a frustrating inability to break out of losing streaks. In my season wrap-up post, I documented several extended losing spells. In most of them, St Louis needed to wait for a series against a pretty bad team (like Philadelphia) before they could pull themselves out of their tailspin.
As to the record against winning teams, think about 27-44. That is a .380 winning percentage. If you took a fairly good AAA team and had them play 71 games against average major league teams, this is about the record you would expect them to compile. In fact, this winning percentage is also the lowest of any Cardinal team in this century, breaking the one-year-old record of the 2016 team that floundered along at 24-35 (.407) against teams that won at least as many as they lost.
I promise you that the talent gap isn’t that great between the Cardinals and the other winning teams in the league. This points strictly to toughness.
Over the course of the entire century, St Louis is 766-566 (.575) after a loss, and 713-688 (.509) against winning teams.
So, who are the players who have routinely fallen short in these character games? It’s time, I suppose, to name names.
Enduring the worst season of his career, Piscotty also routinely came up short in tough situations. He hit .213 against winning teams (29 for 136) with 3 home runs. This included a .179 average (5 for 28 – all singles) after the All-Star Break. During the season’s second half he was also 10 for 57 (.175) in games after a loss, and just 3 for 24 with runners in scoring position. Renowned for his prowess with runners in scoring position through the first two seasons of his career, Piscotty hit just .125 in the second half this year with ducks on the pond.
I don’t think anyone in the organization believes that 2017 will be a representative year in the career of Stephen Piscotty. A combination of things conspired to derail his season early, and he never found his way back. But, with talented outfielders rising through the system, the organization will now be forced to re-evaluate their commitment to Piscotty. Further complicating the issue is that, should they decide to trade Stephen, they are unlikely to get full trade value.
Piscotty is a very cerebral player, and very likely to figure things out. Whatever his future with the organization, Stephen is one player who could profit greatly by hitting the ground running next season.
This, I suppose, should be expected. Rookie right-hander Luke Weaver was mostly a revelation during the last part of the second half. But the young man still has some lessons to learn that the league’s better clubs are all too willing to teach.
Luke made 5 starts against winning teams, culling just 1 quality start. He served up 6 home runs in 24.2 innings, compiling a 2-2 record with an 8.03 ERA and a .321/.381/.547 batting line against. It will be interesting to see how quickly he learns and adapts.
Matthew Bowman was a bit exposed – especially late in the season – by the better teams. In 35 games (26.2 innings) against higher quality opponents, Matthew was pushed around a bit to the tune of a 5.06 ERA and a .284 batting average against.
Not So Cut and Dried
A few of the players on the team, though, defy an easy label. In this difficult off-season, these will be the hardest decisions the organization will have to make, as guessing wrong will come with consequences.
For the last two seasons, Randal has been the almost-emergent superstar. In each of the last two seasons, his final numbers have disappointed. But in both seasons he has shown enough hint of promise to earn another chance.
Grichuk finished 2017 with much the same totals as 2016. The batting average fell a couple of notches to .238 (from .240) and the home runs dipped from 24 to 22. He ended 2017 slugging .473 after slugging .480 the year before. Overall, less than compelling.
But, he did hit .265/.303/.550 with 13 of his home runs in 189 at bats after the break. So now, the organization has to decide if that was just a tease? Or is it real progress?
He ended the year at just .218 (43 of 197) against winning teams, but hit 11 of his 22 home runs against them. In the second half, he was 20 of 83 (.241) when playing winning teams, but with a .542 slugging percentage as half of those 20 hits went for extra bases – including 7 home runs.
In games after a loss, Randal checked in with a disappointing .201 average (36 of 179), including just .188 (15 for 80) in the second half – but again, with a .438 slugging percentage.
Randal mostly split right field with Piscotty in the season’s second half. In Grichuk’s 34 starts the team was 22-12. They were 13-18 in Piscotty’s 31 starts.
There is no question that Randal was productive in the second half. His 13 home runs were only 3 behind team-leader Paul DeJong in 100 fewer at bats. If the Grichuk of the second half had had a 500 at bat season he would have hit 34 home runs with his .265 batting average and .550 slugging percentage.
With Randal’s potential, you would hope for more than that. But, if the Randal they saw in the second half is the Randal that they can count on seeing all of next year, I think they could accept that.
Matt Carpenter’s entire season is tough to get a handle on. On the one hand, he drew a career high 109 walks, leading to the second-highest on-base percentage of his career (.384). On the other hand, his batting average continued to sink – down to .241 (30 points lower than his previous worst average). On the other hand, he was apparently battling shoulder issues all season – perhaps accounting for much of that loss of production. On the other hand, after playing in at least 154 games a year from 2013 through 2015, Matt has followed with two injury plagued seasons. He also hit 23 home runs (his third consecutive 20-homer season) and slugged a solid .451. His final OPS of .835 is still well above league average, but below either of his previous two seasons.
In his games against winning teams, Matt hit just .221 (49 of 222), but drew 38 walks, helping him to a .341 on base percentage. He made 141 starts this year, with the team going 70-71 (.496) when he was in the lineup, and 13-8 (.619) when he wasn’t.
So did Matt have a good year or not? With the home runs and the on base, I suppose that I would have to call it good, but troubling. By degrees, Matt is becoming more valuable for his ability to walk than for his ability to hit the ball. And, by degrees, the team is starting to feel the loss of that big hit.
Carpenter is one of the team’s core members, and he will be on the field somewhere on opening day (barring another injury). But a lot of elements in his career trajectory concern me.
While this was – in many ways – a triumphal season for Michael Wacha, he is still coming up short in these character games. After suffering through three injury plagued seasons, an offseason workout regimen kept Michael on the field for 30 starts and 165.2 innings. The anticipation is that his 12-9 record and 4.13 ERA will be marks to build on going forward.
It may, indeed, play out that way. It is, nonetheless, true, that Wacha (who excelled against good teams and in stopper situations early in his career) continues to trend down in these games.
From 2013 through 2015, Wacha pitched in 40 games (35 starts) against teams that boasted winning records for the season. He was 15-9 in those games with a 3.08 ERA and a .217 batting average against.
In 2013 and 2014, Wacha pitched in 12 games (10 starts) after a Cardinal loss. He was 5-3 with a 2.88 ERA in those situations, holding batters to a .195 batting average.
In 2017, Wacha was only 2-6 in 12 starts against winning teams. His 5.90 ERA was accompanied by a .296/.365/.502 batting line against. He was 5-4 in 13 starts following a Cardinal loss, but with a 4.76 ERA. Since 2015, Wacha is 4-10 against winning teams with a 5.70 ERA, and since 2014 he is 15-9, but with a 4.64 ERA in games after a loss.
Wacha is yet another enigma on this team. Beyond the physical issues, there has been a palpable loss of mojo. The spectacular hero of the 2013 playoffs has lost that big game feel. Wacha is one of the players who could make a huge difference next year if he can channel his earlier self.
In spite of the fact that he tossed his first two complete-game shutouts and crossed over both the 200-inning and 200-strikeout plateaus for the first time in his career, Carlos Martinez regressed noticeably in 2017. After going 14-7 with a 3.01 ERA in 2015 (his first year in the rotation), and 16-9 with a 3.04 ERA last year, Carlos saw those numbers sink to 12-11 with a 3.64 ERA. And the core difficulty that he had was with winning teams.
In his first two seasons in the rotation, Martinez had gone 12-9 with a 3.35 ERA against winning teams. He had put together quality starts in 17 of his 26 starts against them.
He made 15 starts against winning teams this year. Only 7 of those fulfilled the standards for a quality start. Even though he has “stuff” the equal of any pitcher in the game, he was only 4-7 with a 4.28 ERA in those games. He was just 1-3 with a 6.12 ERA with a .301 batting average against them in the second half of the season. After allowing just 12 home runs in 166.2 innings against winning teams his first two years in the rotation, he served up 11 in 90.1 innings against them last year.
In all likelihood, this is just a bump in the road for Carlos. But there were a couple of concerning developments that I noticed that need to be solved somehow, or Martinez will never realize his potential.
For one thing, Martinez continually tries to do too much. His anointing as the ace of the staff this year may have fed into this tendency. Especially in big games, he tries too much to give extra effort. In a game that rewards players that learn to play within themselves, this will usually be counterproductive.
It was noted that Carlos complicated three consecutive late-season starts by throwing away routine double-play balls. More than this, though, Martinez’ need to do too much affected his fielding for much of the season. He dove, scrambled, and lunged for every near-by ground ball. He probably caused nearly a dozen infield hits by deflecting grounders that would have been right to his infielders.
On several occasions, he even kicked at ground balls to his right, like a hockey goalie trying to make a skate save. Now, I ask you, what good could come of that? Who in the world could make a play on a ball that Carlos has deflected with his foot?
It’s all part and parcel of a young pitcher losing control of himself.
The other issue is even more concerning. There sometimes – especially in big games – seems to be an emotional fragility to Martinez. Something in his confidence seems to drain if the opposing team has early success against him. He hasn’t fully mastered the ability to gather himself after bad things happen and continue to pitch within himself.
There is no better example of this than the game that sent the Cardinal season spinning toward its final destination (box score).
For ten batters on a beautiful Friday afternoon in Wrigley, Carlos Martinez was untouchable. His 100-mph fast ball jumped and ran like a thing alive, and his slider was about eleven different flavors of filthy. The defending champion Cubs – possessors of one of the most potent lineups in baseball – couldn’t touch him. Five of the ten batters struck out, and four of the others hit groundouts. Of his first 43 pitches, 30 were strikes.
Then Kris Bryant – the eleventh batter to face him – looped a fly ball to right on a 2-0 pitch. It wasn’t hit terribly well or terribly far. If this incident had happened at Busch, Piscotty would have probably been about a step on the track as he made the catch. But in Wrigley it was just far enough to creep over that overhanging basket for a game-tying home run.
And with that, the air went out of Carlos Martinez.
The first 10 batters he faced got no hits. Six of the last 16 he faced got hits. After striking out 5 of the first 10, he didn’t strike out another batter. While 30 of his first 43 pitches were strikes, only 31 of his final 57 made it to the strike zone. None of the first 10 batters walked. Carlos walked 3 of the last 16 and hit another as his once dominating slider flew wildly all over the place.
Carlos ended the affair lasting just 5.1 innings. On a day that he started with devastating stuff, he ended serving up 7 runs on 6 hits and 3 walks.
Being “the man” requires uncommon mental and emotional discipline. The next level for Martinez lies just beyond that barrier.
Let it be noted that in three years in the rotation, Carlos is 17-8 with a 2.96 ERA in games after a loss. That includes his 4-3, 2.61 mark this year in those situations.
Better Than the Numbers Suggest
One player deserves mention in a better category. His contribution was greater than his numbers might suggest.
Dexter Fowler was the big free agent acquisition after being one of the drivers of Chicago’s championship the year before. His final numbers were sort of ordinary (.264 batting average with 18 home runs). He also hit just .225 (42 for 187) against winning teams, and .237 (52 of 219) in games following a loss. Not overly impressive.
But Fowler’s season was a story of two halves. Hobbled by a variety of injuries in the first half (mostly his feet), Dexter limped to a .248 average (albeit with 14 home runs). He had hit .199 (27 of 136) against winning teams, and .201 (28 of 139) in games after a loss.
As his health improved, Fowler became a decided force for good throughout the second half. He hit .288/.400/.488 after the break, including .294 with a .400 on base percentage against winning teams, and .300 with a .402 on base percentage in games after a loss.
The guy I saw at the end of the season is the guy I’m excited to see all year next year.
Setting the Bar
The Cardinals did have a few players who consistently rose to the challenge of the games against the better teams. They should get a notice as well.
Tommy’s break-through season wasn’t limited to beating up on lesser teams. Tommy hit .287 against over .500 teams with a .391 on base percentage. He also hit .330/.451/.558 in games after a loss. He also hit .305/.420/.514 with runners in scoring position. Tommy had himself a year.
It’s probably fitting that I spend the last few paragraphs that I am likely to devote to the 2017 baseball season to Lance Lynn. While the Cardinals repeatedly fell short against winning teams, Lance was 4-3 against them, with 4 other potential wins lost in the bullpen. He posted a 3.09 ERA against these teams in 78.2 innings, with a .196 batting average against him.
Are we really, really sure we want to cut ties with him?
Again, I am just one voice. But the message clearly sent from the 2017 season is that this team’s greatest need is not some aging slugger to bat fourth. The greatest gap between the Cards and the Cubs – and the other good teams in the majors – is the character gap. If this were my team, this is the area that I would focus on first.