Archives for October 2022

Are the Giants For Real?

If the primary defensive objective was to stop running back Saquon Barkley, the Jacksonville Jaguars would have had to have gone into the locker room at halftime last Sunday more than satisfied with their first 30 minutes. In 9 carries, Barkley had accounted for but 18 yards. He had 15 more on 2 catches. If the perception that the NY Giant offense runs through Barkley is true, then the Jaguars and their third-ranked run defense seemed to be in good shape.

Through the first 6 weeks of their season, the 5-1 New York team had leaned on its running attack. It’s a somewhat surprising departure in approach, given that their new head coach Brian Daboll had spent the previous four years over-seeing an offense in Buffalo that was all but completely indifferent to the run.

But life is very different in East Rutherford, New Jersey. As the Bills offensive coordinator, his offense ran through the electric talents of his star quarterback, Josh Allen. His quarterback in New York – Daniel Jones – undertakes a very different role. Daniel is not asked to necessarily win games for the Giants. As the one-time sixth-overall pick in the draft is being re-programed to be a system quarterback, his primary job is not to lose games.

Jones took the field against the Jaguars having completes 67.3% of his passes (the fourth highest percentage in the NFL), but for just 9.5 yards per completion (the second lowest in the NFL). He had thrown just 2 interceptions through his first 6 games, while taking 19 sacks. Jones’ sack rate of 10.7% of his pass attempts was the second highest such figure in football.

Here, the heavy lifting is done by the fourth-ranked running game that averaged 163 yards per game and 5.0 yards per rush. Through six games, they had more rushing touchdowns (8) than passing touchdowns (5). And Barkley, of course, was the hub of that running attack. His 119 carries were the most in the league, and his 616 yards placed him second. So, muffling Saquon was a very big deal.

The raspberry seed in Jacksonville’s collective wisdom teeth was that even without Saquon having much of an impact, the Giants had still controlled the clock for the first half (16:24 of the 30 minutes), had still amassed 61 rushing yards (already more than two-thirds of the ground yardage that the Jags usually allow for an entire game), and took a 13-11 lead into the locker room.

It’s usually a bad sign when, in spite of achieving one of your principal goals, your team is trailing at half time.

Along Came Jones

So, if it wasn’t Barkley, where was the Giant offense coming from? Well, that would be Jones, the sometimes overlooked and frequently embattled quarterback. Taking full advantage of Jacksonville’s concentration on stopping the run, Daniel picked them apart, completing 15 of 22 passes (68.2%) for 168 yards and a touchdown. Almost as significant, though, was his contribution with his legs. Daniel – who came into the game as New York’s second leading rusher (although his 236 rushing yards were far removed from Barkley’s total) – added 37 rushing yards in the first half and a couple of important first downs.

Those running yards were to be a preview of coming attractions.

The Big Finish

In a second half, Jones would throw just 8 more passes, as the dominant New York run game would chew up 175 ground yards on 25 rushing attempts. By the fourth quarter, they weren’t even bothering with the cute, mis-direction-based running game that had so befuddled the Jags for most of the half. By the fourth quarter (when New York rang up 130 of those rushing yards), they were lining blocking tight end Chris Myarick up in the backfield, and pulling backup guard Joshua Ezeudu, and simply collapsing the left side of the Jacksonville defense.

At this point, as you might imagine, Saquon was no longer a bystander. Riding a 92-yard second half, Barkley surged to a 110-yard rushing day, adding 25 more on 4 pass receptions.

But the X-factor continued to be quarterback Jones. Not Daniel the passer (he was only 4 for 8 for 34 yards after the break), but Daniel the runner. Building on his first half, Jones add 70 more rushing yards (including a touchdown among 5 more first downs) on 7 carries to eclipse 100 yards rushing (he finished with 107) for the first time in his career.

It’s an impressive number, but how it happened is, perhaps, even more illuminating. Thirty-eight of those yards came on two scrambles when Jacksonville sent extra-rushers, but didn’t stay in their rush lanes. Forty-one of the remaining 69 yards came on 4 read-option plays that the Jags badly misplayed.

Longtime football watchers are familiar with the read-option. The quarterback sticks the ball in the belly of the running back and watches the reaction of an unblocked end. If the end stays wide, the quarterback releases the ball, and the back exploits the opening caused by the un-blocked end’s delay. If the end charges the back, the quarterback deftly pulls the ball back and races into the void left by the on-rushing end. This play has been around for several seasons, now – and is still largely effective. Most teams, by this point, are playing it better than when the concept was new.

But not Jacksonville. Not on this afternoon. Focus riveted on Barkley, Jacksonville’s ends kept gifting Jones the unguarded edges of their defense.

With 8:22 left in the game, Jacksonville still ahead 17-13 at this point, the Giants lined up, first-and-ten on the Jags’ 40 yards line. Even though New York had been gashing them with this play all day, the un-blocked end (Arden Key) fired himself into the backfield, chasing Barkley down from behind, oblivious to the fact that Saquon never had the ball. Daniel didn’t even have to make some athletic move to dart in behind Key. He simply waited for Arden to go sailing by, and then almost casually rambled for 9 yards through the vacated left side.

At times, it truly was too easy.

That play was the inflection point of a 79-yard drive (with all the yardage coming on the ground) that resulted in the go-ahead touchdown in what would eventually be a 23-17 New York win (gamebook) (summary).

Now 6-1, the Giants have thrust themselves into the middle of a compelling three-team scramble for supremacy in the NFC East. No longer the NFC “Least,” the Giants are doing battle with the 6-0 Eagles and the 5-2 Cowboys. With their success based on the running game, and that running game now including the growing danger of Jones as a runner, the Giants’ plan appears to be sustainable. As long as they can keep Jones playing within himself.

My Favorite Drive of the Season

It wasn’t just the drive itself. It was the circumstances surrounding it.

Last Sunday afternoon, the Atlanta Falcons ran into a buzzsaw in Cincinnati. The aroused Bengal offense scored touchdowns on each of their first three possessions, on drives of 84, 71 and 75 yards. In the booth, announcers Brandon Gaudin and Robert Smith agreed that – at this point – the run-first Falcons had little option other than to start throwing the ball. It’s that prevalent knee-jerk reaction. Son, you’re down by 21 points. Even though the second quarter was only 5 seconds old, it was still time to trash your game plan and throw, throw, throw.

Instead, the Falcons responded with a glorious 16-play, 75-yard drive that chewed 10:09 off the clock and resulted in a 1-yard touchdown run from Tyler Allgeier. Only 3 of the plays were passes.

Make no mistake about it. Of all the run-first offenses in the NFL, the Falcons are as adamant about their run game as anyone. They entered the game ranked second in football in rush attempts (202) and were third in yards per game (165.2). On a day where they trailed by double-digits for most of the game, and by as many as 21 points on a couple of occasions, the Falcons still ran the ball 29 times.

A drive like that almost always flips the momentum of the game. For one thing, an extended drive like this (which was made even longer by a replay review) almost always cools down the other offense.

Not today.

Without missing a beat, the Bengal offense subsequently moved 84 yards on 7 plays (taking just 3:57) to answer the Atlanta touchdown with another of their own, on their way to an eventual 35-17 win (gamebook) (summary).

Even in defeat, though, the Falcons have shown themselves to be a dangerous running team. But there’s another side to both the 16-play drive and the 29 rushing attempts for the day. When you run the ball like that, in these circumstances, it’s half design and half desperation.

By design, this team believes in the good things that will happen if they keep running the ball. But this kind of running is also an admission that they don’t have the passing game that can bring them back from this kind of deficit.

Over his last two games, quarterback Marcus Mariota has been statistically spectacular. He has completed 21 of his last 27 passes (77.8%) for 253 yards and 3 touchdowns, without interception – a 142.7 rate. But don’t be deceived by that. Mariota’s passing success has come as a kind of change-up off the running game. This is evidenced by the paucity of passes thrown over the last two games.

By contrast, Cincinnati’s Joe Burrow threw the ball almost as many times in the first half on Sunday (25) as Marcus has over the last two games. And Burrow threw for more yards (344) and as many touchdowns (3) in that one half (on his way to a 481-yard game) than Mariota has managed in the two games combined.

The Falcons are a team that bears watching, but this is the piece that’s holding them back. Until they find the quarterback that makes their passing game dangerous, they will continue to be sorely disadvantaged when they fall behind.

Football

Good Things Happen . . .

When Philadelphia cornerback Darius Slay undercut the route of Cowboy receiver Michael Gallup, intercepting a pass with 5:14 left in the first half of last Sunday night’s contest, it gave the Eagles possession on the Dallas 46 – Philly’s third straight possession that began in Cowboy territory.

It had been just a 7-0 Eagle lead one play into the second quarter, but the subsequent Dallas possessions ended in an interception on the Cowboy 44, an ill-advised turnover on downs at the Dallas 34, and now a second interception. Three minutes and 27 seconds of playing time later, kicker Jake Elliott drained the 34-yard field goal that pushed the Eagle lead to 20-0 with 1:47 left in the first half.

This kind of thing happens often enough in the NFL that what happens next is usually predictable. Somewhere along the way to a 20-point deficit, the game-plan goes out the window. Almost without exception, a sizeable deficit spells the end of the running game, and the beginning of a full-fledged aerial assault.

When Will Cooler Heads Prevail?

This is so commonly done that the adjustment isn’t even questioned. Son, you’re down 20-0. You gotta throw the ball. Here’s the problem with that. There are only a few passing attacks in the NFL that are potent enough to give their team a chance to come back without the support of a running game. In almost every case, the decision to sideline the running attack and throw, throw, throw is suicidal.

Prominent among the teams that would flounder miserably reduced to just the passing aspect of their offense are these very Dallas Cowboys. I have nothing but respect for Cooper Rush, who has solidly led the Cowboys in the absence of injured starting quarterback Dak Prescott. But even if Prescott were behind center, a desperate air attack against an excellent Philadelphia secondary was little more than an invitation to disaster. And, of course, even more so with the back-up quarterback in there.

Even so, this is just what I expected to happen. I expected about 30 second-half passes from Cooper, with several short completions offset by a few more interceptions and other third- and fourth-down incompletions.

Imagine my surprise when Cowboy Offensive Coordinator and play-caller Kellen Moore came out running the ball in the second half.

After the Cowboy defense chased the Philly offense off the field, Rush and the Cowboy offense began their second half on their own 21, trailing 20-3. They embarked on a 9-play, 79-yard drive that ground 4:28 off the clock. Six of the plays were runs, including the last three. Ezekiel Elliott was nearly untouched as he covered the last 14 yards.

Dallas wouldn’t make it all the way back to win the game. The Eagles (now 6-0) would hold onto a 26-17 decision (game book) (summary). But the Cowboys would run the ball a total of 17 times in the game after they fell behind by 20 points. By staying with the running game, they not only gave the passing attack a chance to succeed, but they completely flipped the momentum of the game.

More than just the points at the end of the drive, the second half running game gave Dallas control of the game. After being outgained by the Eagles, 173-81, in the first half, Dallas flipped the second half narrative, outgaining Philly 234-95, closing at one point to 20-17. They needed their defense or special teams to chip in with something to push them over the top.

Instead, the Eagles answered Dallas’ second touchdown with a 13-play, 75-yard gut-punch drive of their own that swallowed 7:37 of the final period, resulting in a 7-yard touchdown pass from Jalen Hurts to DeVonta Smith. After the two-point conversion failed, the Eagle defense drove the final nail in the Cowboy coffin.

Down by just 9 with still 5:16 to play, Dallas faced a second-and-eight on its own 40. With receiver CeeDee Lamb shaking free up the left sideline, the Cowboys had a big-play opportunity present itself. But defensive end Brandon Graham slid through the protection and managed to bury Rush just as he threw. The ball fluttered out of his hand, ending up in the arms of cornerback C.J. Gardner-Johnson – a third and final interception that the Cowboys just couldn’t overcome.

Not So Isolated an Incident

Be it noted, though, that even in defeat the Cowboys made a statement about their running game and the value that running the ball has even when your team trails by a sizeable margin. And Dallas isn’t the only team doing that recently. There have been more than a few among the younger coaching staffs that haven’t been quite as willing to abandon the run as some of their predecessors.

As the general attitude of the NFL toward the running game seems to be evolving, there is more than one coaching staff out there that understands that very good things can happen if you keep running the ball.

Daboll a Believer?

One of the surprising new disciples of the running game is new Giants’ head coach Brian Daboll. Surprising because his previous job was as the Offensive Coordinator in Buffalo, where his take on the running game was indifferent at best.

Of course, now as head coach of Big Blue, one of the assets that Brian has inherited is a top running back named Saquon Barkley. It has made a difference in his philosophy.

The Giants entered last Sunday’s contest against Baltimore ranked second in the NFL in rushing (179.0 yards per game), third in rushing attempts (165), third in rushing touchdowns (7), and fourth in yards per rush attempt (5.4). As for Mr. Barkley, he entered the affair as the NFL’s second leading rusher (533 yards), and third in carries (97). Suffice it to say that the running attack figured prominently into the Giant game-plan.

But things couldn’t have gone worse in that aspect. The Ravens and Giants hit halftime with Baltimore up 10-7 and dominating the ground war. Averaging 8.1 yards per attempt, Baltimore – one of the original proponents of the ground attack – had racked up 121 rushing yards. New York’s own ground game was muffled at just 16 yards on 9 carries. Saquon had contributed 14 of those yards on 6 carries.

Surely, Brian could have reasonably gone into the locker room thinking, well, there’s no running the ball today. Time to throw, throw, throw. Certainly, if he were still in Buffalo, that is exactly what he would have done. But on this Sunday afternoon, Daboll’s commitment to the run was exceptional.

Throughout the entirety of the second half, the running game never got untracked. New York averaged only 3.0 yards per rush after intermission, with no single running play accounting for more than 8 yards. Nevertheless, the Giants ground away – 22 times in all in the second half.

With 12:54 left in the game, a 12-yard touchdown pass from Lamar Jackson to Mark Andrews pushed the Baltimore lead to 20-10 – a circumstance that would normally lead to high levels of panic among the trailing coaching staff. But here there was no panic.

Coolly, the Giants answered with a 12-play, 75-yard drive that drained nearly seven (6:53) precious minutes from the remaining fourth-quarter allotment. Seven of the plays were runs – even though those seven runs only contributed 18 yards to the drive. But the commitment to the run kept the defenses honest, and the pass rushes at bay, allowing quarterback Daniel Jones to account for the other 57 yards of the drive as he completed all five passes he tossed.

As with the Cowboys, the Giants got the points and the momentum. Unlike the Cowboys, though, the Giant defense rose to the moment.

With 3:04 left in the game, an early snap caught Jackson by surprise, the ball glancing off of him and rolling free in the backfield. Lamar swooped down on the ball and plucked it deftly off the turf. With a couple of pass rushers in hot pursuit, Jackson, sprinting to his right, unloaded a panicked throw toward fullback Patrick Ricard. At that point, a defensive back named Julian Love stepped in front of the toss, returning his interception to the Baltimore 13 yards line. From there, it took the now 5-1 Giants just three plays to reach pay-dirt with the touchdown that decided this one, 24-20 (game book) (summary).

The Giants controlled the clock for 19:18 of the second half.

The Ravens (now 3-3) have led in the fourth quarter in all three of their losses this season.

Speaking of the Bills

Sitting in Brian’s old chair in Buffalo is Ken Dorsey, who, since 2019, had been the quarterbacks’ coach for the Bills – so his level of familiarity with the players and the system is very high. And the talented Bills have not, so far, missed a beat. They landed in Kansas City last week boasting the number one offense and number one passing attack in the NFL. With 152 points scored after five weeks, they were football’s second-highest scoring team. Second only to the foe they were facing. The Chiefs had scored 159 points in five weeks.

During the broadcast, a concerted effort was made to point out the similarities between the two marquee quarterbacks – Buffalo’s Josh Allen and KC’s Patrick Mahomes. Both were somewhat overlooked coming out of small schools. There is one huge difference between he two that, perhaps, doesn’t get as much notice as it should.

Patrick Mahomes – overlooked or not – never struggled at the NFL level. From the moment that Andy Reid gave him the reigns of the offense in 2018, Patrick was setting records and leaving the NFL in his dust. For Allen, the beginning was much different.

The big-armed right-hander was only 5-6 in his rookie year (2018), while completing just 52.8% of his passes and throwing more interceptions (12) than touchdowns (10). His rating that first year was a troubling 67.9. In his second year, he boosted that to only 85.3, as he was still completing just 58.8% of his passes.

The overhaul of Josh Allen was nearly total, as the Buffalo coaching staff worked to completely re-invent his mechanics. So, when you see Josh now going toe-to-toe with Mahomes, understand that he came from a spot far behind Patrick as far as being NFL ready.

I want to be careful as I point out the amount of work that Allen has put into transforming himself from raw talent to elite craftsman. That effort is certainly there, but I don’t want that misread into meaning that everything has just come easy for Mahomes. Patrick has put in every bit as much effort into his craft as Josh has. But Allen has done it while absorbing everything he’s needed to absorb as a starting quarterback in the NFL. It’s really a significant achievement.

The Difference is the Defense

Buffalo’s 24-20 victory (game book) (summary) gives the Bills a 5-1 record and temporary bragging rights over the Chiefs. At this point of the season, the primary difference between these two clubs is clearly the defenses. The Chiefs are still a work in progress on that side of the ball. Entering their contest against the Bills, Kansas City was allowing opposing passers to complete 69.3% of the passes thrown against them (the third-worst figure in the NFL). They were also tied for last in touchdown passes allowed (12), while trailing only the Giants in fewest passes intercepted (1). [New York actually had no pass interceptions through their first 5 games. The decisive fourth-quarter pick against Jackson was their first of the season.]

In contrast, coach Sean McDermott has backed his elite offense with a top defense. The Buffalo defense, coming into their contest against KC, ranked second in yardage and first in points allowed (just 61). Among the challenges they presented for Mahomes was a pass defense that ranked first in the NFL in yards allowed per completion (9.4), most interceptions (8), highest percentage of passes intercepted (4.8), and lowest opposing passer rating (67.8). They had also given up the second-fewest touchdown passes (3) and carried the third-lowest touchdown percentage (1.8%). Additionally, they were sacking opposing passers on 8.8% of their drop-backs, the fifth-best such figure in the NFL. So Mahomes’ challenge last Sunday was substantial.

Of the many impressive aspects of this defense, perhaps none was so impressive on Sunday as their ability to plaster to the KC receivers even when Mahomes managed to extend the play. Through his first five games, Mahomes was 42 for 77 (54.55%) on passes that took more than 2.5 seconds. These completions went for 668 yards and 7 touchdowns with only 1 interception – a 108.6 rating. Against the Bills on Sunday, he was just 11 of 22 (50%) on extended plays for just 164 yards. He threw both of his touchdowns, but also both of his interceptions when he needed more than 2.5 seconds to throw – a 67.2 rating.

As always, Josh Allen and the passing game will continue to garner the Lion’s share of the attention. But Buffalo’s defense will be every bit as responsible for their success going forward.

Baseball

True Grit

I have always maintained – and continue to assert – that having the best team is not at all a predictor of playoff success in baseball – whereas it is the primary predictor of success in the football playoffs. This is because the narrow advantages that separate one team from another in baseball pretty much take an entire season to express themselves.

Let’s take, for example, the recently concluded wildcard series between Philadelphia and St Louis – a best of three set, won by the Phillies in two.

With 93 wins, the Cardinals boasted a better record than the 87-win Phillies. I would make the argument that the comparative records don’t tell the entire story, but for argument’s sake, let’s say that the Cardinals are a six-game better team than Philadelphia. In baseball terms, this is a significant margin. This was about the lead that St Louis maintained over Milwaukee for most of the last month of the season. This distance was great enough that the Brewers were not even in serious contention for the last two weeks of the season. In baseball, being six games better is quite significant.

But remember, that six-game differential was crafted over the course of 162 regular season games, so that works out to one game of separation for every 27 games played. So, for this playoff series to accurately reflect the true difference between the Cards and Phils, they would have to do a best 14 out of 27 games. And, of course, as the distance between the two clubs shrinks, the number of games needed to separate them would grow. The Mets and Braves finished with identical records atop the NL East division. How could even a seven-game series realistically settle which of them was better.

The regular season record is a significant indicator (within parameters) of the relative quality of the team – a complex computation that takes into account health, depth, in-season moves, and which players are outperforming expectations, and which are not. All of that is pretty much set to the side once the playoffs start.

In the short series’ that will determine baseball’s eventual champion, two characteristics stand supreme – momentum and grit.

Momentum

Momentum is a capricious commodity in baseball. It shows up and disappears without warning. Of all of the elements directing a short series, nothing tops momentum, when you’ve got it. Nobody beats the hot team.

The extremes of baseball’s relationship to momentum are adequately demonstrated in the two championships the Cards have secured this century. The 2011 team was momentum on steroids. After a 4-1 loss to the Brewers on September 5, the 74-67 Cardinals were 10.5 games behind division-leading Milwaukee, and 8.5 games out of the last playoff spot with 21 games to play. But they closed out the season on a 16-5 run, sliding into that final playoff spot on the last day of the season.

On their way to the title, St Louis overcame the 102-win Phillies, the 96-win Brewers, and the 96-win Rangers. They were not the team to be messed with.

The champions from 2006 were about as opposite as you could imagine. A team that endured two 8-game losing streaks, and another seven-game tailspin that wasn’t halted until almost the eve of the playoffs (September 27), the Cardinals looked no more like contenders than the Cleveland Indians of “Major League” fame. In spite of a final game loss, this team went wheezing into the playoffs where they were pronounced significant underdogs in every series they played.

But, then, out of nowhere Momentum came to call. On their way to the championship, they took down the 88-win Padres, the 97-win Mets (a team 14 games better than them during the season), and the 95-win Tigers. At the beginning of that series – as I’m sure you will remember if you’re old enough – the USA Today famously predicted Detroit in Three.

Momentum is a wrecking ball, but it’s kind of like baseball’s version of Grace. You can’t earn it. You just stay ready and hope to accept it when it is bestowed on you.

From July 27 to September 7, the Cards were Momentum’s darlings. All facets of their team blended together, as they won 30 of 39 games – leaving them a comfortable 9.5 games ahead in the division with but 25 to play. But, in this particular instance, they peaked too soon. Counting the two playoff games lost, St Louis finished the season on a 12-15 run. Nothing they could do seemed able to coax that mysterious companion back to their side.

Momentum is certainly a head scratcher.

Over-Analyzing Things

The two losses to the Phillies – being that they were playoff games – will receive much more scrutiny than any two other games this season. There has already been considerable hand wringing over the disappearing offense – and there is no use sugar-coating things. Philadelphia’s pitchers pushed the Cardinal hitters around. St Louis scored 3 runs in the 2 games, and hit .185 (12 for 65) with just 1 extra-base hit (a two-run home run off the bat of Juan Yepez that gave the Cards hope that they would win the first game).

But as with any small sample size, things are rarely as cut and dried as they appear. The Cardinals “barreled” four pitches during the series. Barreling – according to the Statcast system that tracks it – is that perfect combination of exit velocity and launch angle. During the regular season, Cardinal hitters barreled 325 balls, hitting .776 when they did so, with a 2.607 slugging percentage. One-hundred and sixty-nine of the baseballs thus assaulted left the park. Only 28 of the home runs hit by the Cards this year were not barreled. Seventy-three other barreled pitches wound up as extra-base hits (65 doubles and 8 triples). But, against the Phillies, only Yepez’ home run proved a hit, as the other three died on the warning track.

By contrast, Philly was 2-for-2 when they barreled balls during the series – both of those coming in the second game (Bryce Harper’s home run, and the double from Alec Bohm that started the fifth-inning rally that tagged on the last run).

Against the .185 the Cards actually batted in the series is the .260 expected batting average calculated from the combination of exit velocity and launch angle. In essence, they should have had about 5 more hits during the two games than they got.

I’m not pleading bad luck, here. I’m just saying that it’s baseball. On a different day under different circumstances (and perhaps with a bit of momentum at their tails) things might have gone very differently.

One of the local sportswriters has branded Paul Goldschmidt and Nolan Arenado as “officially playoff question marks” based on their respective 0-for-7 and 1-for-8 batting lines in these two games. It’s a bit much for two games, don’t you think?

Grit

Grit is a different animal entirely. Not as flighty or mercurial as Momentum, Grit is a more stable character trait. It’s the toughness that allows some players to rise to the moment. In its playoff sense, it is less an individual trait, and more something the team develops together. The 2011 Cardinals may have been baseball’s perfect combination of Momentum and Grit.

In the specific case of this series, I think the circumstances that surrounded these two teams went a long way in the development of the kind of toughness that it takes to win in the playoffs.

Consider this:

The Cardinals played in a division that hosted two 100-loss teams. Anytime they started to slide a bit, or take some tough losses, they almost always had a series against Cincinnati or Pittsburgh coming up.

Philadelphia played in the same division with two teams that won 101 games each. Every time they turned around, they had another crucial series against the Braves or Mets.

When all was said and done, St Louis was 34-38 when playing teams that won at least as many as they lost. That record includes their 4-3 performance against a San Francisco team that managed to finish the season exactly at .500. Against teams that actually won more than they lost, they were an uninspiring 30-35.

The Phillies couldn’t afford to lose most of the time when they played winning teams. They were 53-28 against teams that won more than they lost.

The Cards had the last week-and-a-half to coast to the end of the season. Philadelphia was playing meaningful games almost to the very end. In essence, the Phillies have been in playoff mode for most of the season – certainly most of the second half.

Conversely, until the second game of this series, the Cardinals never truly played a “we need this one” game.

It was the same dynamic in last year’s wild-card game. In that one, it was the Dodgers who fought the Giants down to the very end of the season, while St Louis was able to mostly coast at the end. The relative toughness of the Dodgers proved decisive in the end.

If forced to pick the one element that separated theses two team for two evenings in St Louis, I would say that Philadelphia was more toughened by the challenges presented them during the season.

And at the end of the day, the Grit won out.

Statcast Summaries

The Baseball Savant website gives every fan access to a wealth of information about each pitch thrown in each game. Here’s a Statcast glimpse at the Cardinal pitching staff this year:

Most Thrown Pitch: Adam Wainwright’s curve. Adam threw his Uncle Charlie 995 time this season. A bit behind him was Andre Pallante’s four-seamer – thrown 958 times in 2022.

Least Thrown Pitch: Statcast credited each of the following “pitchers” with throwing one – and only one – of the following pitches this season. Corey Dickerson, 1 curveball; Jordan Hicks, 1 cutter; Andrew Knizner, 1 changeup; Yadier Molina, 1 eephus; Packy Naughton, 1 curveball; Albert Pujols, 1 changeup; and Zach Thompson, 1 slider.

Fastest Pitch by Average Speed: No surprises here. Ryan Helsley’s four-seamer averaged 99.64 mph. Jordan Hicks’ sinker came in second at 99.36.

Slowest Pitch by Average Speed: Officially, this is Yadi’s eephus pitch. He threw it once, at 42.9 mph. Among actual pitchers – again, no surprise, it is Waino’s curve, which averaged 72.76 mph.

Fastest Pitch Thrown: Helsley delivered the two fastest. On September 27, he unleashed a 104.2-mph four-seamer that retired Rowdy Tellez on a hard-hit grounder to short. Five days earlier, he threw a fastball at 104 even that Josh Bell fouled off.

Slowest Pitch Throw: Again, Molina’s eephus – which missed the strike zone, by the way. On May 15, Albert Pujols unleashed a “curve” that rolled in at 46.6 mph that LaMonte Wade Jr.grounded out on. While officially a strike, this pitch was also out of the zone. For the slowest pitch that actually made it into the strike zone, we find a 46.9 mph curve that Molina tossed to Taylor Walls on June 8. Taylor flew out to left.

As far as actual pitchers go, Miles Mikolas dialed up a 60.2-mph curve to Garrett Mitchell on September 27 – which, according to Wainwright, doesn’t count because it was a ball. The slowest strike actually thrown by a Cardinal pitcher was, in fact, a curve from Waino. He looped in a 63.0-mph curve to Garrett Cooper on June 27. This one, perhaps, got too much of the zone, as Cooper laced it for a ground-rule double.

Most Total Pitches Thrown: Mikolas with 3226 (counting his playoff start). Wainwright was second with 3,133.

Fewest Total Pitches Thrown: Again, the non-pitchers are at the top of this list, starting with Knizner, who threw 11 pitches. Among actual pitchers, the fewest were thrown by Jake Walsh, who tossed 65 pitches in his cameo appearance with the big club. Jake was on the active roster for 11 days, and pitched 2.2 innings in 3 games. Angel Rondon – another Cardinal cameo – was second with 86. Angel pitched 5 innings of shutout, 1-hit ball in his only appearance of the season. He earned the 18-4 win over Pittsburgh that day (May 22). He was later designated for assignment, and claimed by San Francisco. Angel never made it up to San Francisco, but he pitched a few innings at AAA Sacramento, and got hit pretty hard. I believe he is a free agent, now.

Pitch Accounting for Highest Percentage of Pitches Thrown: Knizner’s slider. Of Andrew’s 11 pitches, 10 were “sliders.” A ratio of 90.91%. Among actual pitchers, no one relied on one pitch more than Hicks relied on his sinker, throwing it 65.61% of the time. For the brief time that he was with the big club, T.J. McFarland was also heavily sinker reliant (62.83%).

Pitch Accounting for Lowest Percentage of Pitches Thrown: Hicks’ cutter. Thrown just once in 1076 pitches, that pitch accounted for just 0.09% of Jordan’s arsenal.

Fastest Median Pitch: You remember the old “mean-median-and mode” from grade-school math right? These were three different concepts for determining the “average” of a pitch. The mathematical “averages” we already looked at (that would be the mean). The median is the midpoint of all of the variables – in this case the speed where there were as many faster pitches thrown as slower ones.

Helsley’s fastball, which was thrown for a median speed of 99.7 mph is tied in this metric with Hicks’ fastball. Jordan’s four-seamer was one of his trace pitches – he threw only 7 all year. But he threw them at a median velocity of 99.7. His sinker – which was far and away his predominant pitch – was thrown at a median speed of 99.4 mph.

Slowest Median Pitch (Other than Molina’s Eephus): Among actual pitchers, this was Wainwright’s curve, thrown at a median speed of 73 mph.

Fastest Pitch by Mode: Mode, of course, is the third method of defining an average for a given data set. In this one we return the most frequent member of the set.

The leader here is Junior Fernandez’ fastball. Junior threw 17 fastballs during his tenue as a Cardinal this year, and duplicated the same speed three time. He threw 2 fastballs at 97.5, 2 more at 99.5, and 2 more at 100.1. You could, with equal justification, call any of those his “mode,” although the rules lean to the higher of the options.

Of his 566 fastballs, Helsley threw 20 of them at exactly 99.6 mph. That 99.6 was also the mode for Hick’s sinker. Of the 706 he threw, he hit 99.6 with 25 of them. These would be the more un-ambiguous answers.

Slowest Pitch by Mode: Molina’s slider. Yadi threw 9 “sliders” in his pitching adventures, and managed to throw two of them at exactly 53.1 mph. Among actual pitchers, Wainwright threw 34 curveballs at 73.1 mph, and 34 others at 73.3, meaning either could be his mode. Both are slower than the mode on Matthew Liberatore’s curve (the next slowest). Of his 151 curveballs, he threw 8 at 73.7 mph.

Fastest Pitch to Generate a Strikeout: Helsley struck out San Diego’s Brandon Drury (looking) on a fastball clocked at 103.2. (September 22, eighth inning.)

Fastest Pitch to Yield a Hit: In the first inning of a July 12 game against Los Angeles, Freddie Freeman went opposite field with a 103.1-mph sinker from Hicks, poking it into left for a single.

Fastest Pitch Hit for a Home Run: August 28, seventh inning. Atlanta’s Dansby Swanson landed on a 100.1-mph fastball right down the middle from Helsley, launching the pitch 418 feet over the right-center field wall.

Highest Exit Velocity Allowed: September 9, eighth inning. Pittsburgh rookie Oneil Cruz drilled a Jake Woodford sinker into right for a base hit. The ball left the bat at 117.7 mph.

Hardest Hit Home Run: April 21, sixth inning. Miami’s Jesus Sanchez launched a hanging changeup from Aaron Brooks 428 feet over the wall in right. The ball left the bat at 114 mph.

Farthest Hit Ball: August 9, seventh inning. Colorado’s Ryan McMahon hit one of the absolute moon shots of the season. Ryan crushed a changeup from McFarland 495 feet to right center (and yes, that was in Colorado).

Slowest Pitch to End an At Bat: May 15, ninth inning of a 15-6 blowout. With Pujols on the mound, San Francisco’s LaMonte Wade Jr. grounded to third on a curveball tracked at 46.6 mph.

Slowest Pitch to Yield a Home Run: Earlier in that same inning, Joey Bart caught up with a Pujols curve thrown at 48.7 mph, driving it 375 feet over the left field wall.

Slowest Pitch by an Actual Pitcher that Resulted in a Home Run: May 20, seventh inning. Pittsburgh’s Michael Chavis jumped on a curve from Waino clocked at 71.9 mph, and powered it 396 feet over the left-field wall.

Softest Exit Velocity Allowed: June 15, second inning. Pittsburgh’s Tyler Heineman laid down a bunt against Jack Flaherty that left the bat at 21.2 mph. Heineman received credit for a single, and Pittsburgh scored a run after Flaherty threw the ball away.

Lowest Exit Velocity to Result in a Home Run: May 21, fifth inning. Pittsburgh’s Bryan Reynolds slapped a curve from Liberatore down the left-field line. Leaving the bat at just 94 mph, the ball result in an inside-the-park home run. The softest hit ball that actually left the field of play was a pitch that Arizona’s Jake McCarthy hit off of Hicks in the eighth inning of an August 20 game. Hit at 94.1 mph, the ball managed 384 feet over the right-field wall (yes, the game was in Arizona).

Shortest Fly Ball to Result in a Home Run: September 11, ninth inning. Pittsburgh’s Greg Allen got just enough of a 99.8 mph fastball from Helsley to guide it 348 feet over the right-field wall (and, yes, that game was in Pittsburgh).

And a few for the hitters as well:

Fastest Pitch to Decide an At Bat: Second game of a September 17 doubleheader, first inning. Cincinnati’s Hunter Greene rifles in a fastball at 102.6 mph that Tommy Edman pulls into right-center for a single.

Fastest Pitch Hit for a Home Run: 20 April, ninth inning. Miami right-hander Anthony Bender leaves a 98.5 mph sinker up a bit that Nolan Arenado tags 379 feet over the wall in left.

Highest Exit Velocity: June 19, ninth inning. Juan Yepez scorches a sinker from Boston’s Tyler Danish 398 feet down the left field line for a three-run homer. The ball left his bat at 114.4 mph.

Longest Home Run: September 14, fifth inning. Lars Nootbaar touched Milwaukee’s Corbin Burnes for a 452-foot moon shot over the right-center field wall.

Slowest Pitch Put into Play: June 3, ninth inning. Again, a position-player on the mound. Chicago’s Frank Schwindel delivered a 38.4 mph curveball that Harrison Bader popped right back to him.

Slowest Pitch from an Actual Pitcher to End a Plate Appearance: July 29, third inning. Washington’s Anibal Sanchez walks Tyler O’Neill on a 64.6 mph changeup.

Slowest Pitch from an Actual Pitcher to Result in a Hit: May 2, third inning. Kansas City’s Zack Greinke lobs a 66.3 mph curveball to Brendan Donovan that Brendan strokes into right-center field.

Slowest Pitch Hit for a Home Run: May 22, ninth inning. Bader, batting against another position player (Pittsburgh’s Josh VanMeter), smacked a hanging eephus – if there is such a thing as a non-hanging eephus – 401 feet to left for the homer. The pitch was tracked at 44.6 mph.

Slowest Pitch from an Actual Pitcher to be Hit for a Home Run: May 19, third inning. The Mets’ Chris Bassitt tried to slow Paul Goldschmidt’s bat down with a 73.5 mph slider. But the pitch hung, and Goldy launched it 390 feet to left.

Softest Exit Velocity: 14 April, third inning. Tommy Edman lays down a sacrifice bunt against Milwaukee’s Brandon Woodruff that leaves hit bat at 22.2 mph.

Softest Exit Velocity to Result in a Hit: August 12, fifth inning. Nootbaar beats out a bunt single against Milwaukee’s Eric Lauer. The ball left his bat at 25.6 mph.

Softest Exit Velocity to Result in a Home Run: July 1, third inning. Arenado gets just enough of a slider from Phialdelphia’s Bailey Falter to ease it 355 feet down the left-field line. The ball left Nolan’s bat at just 92.9 mph.

Shortest Home Run Hit: September 8, fourth inning. Molina hits a slider from Washington’s Josiah Gray 350 feet down the left-field line. Far enough to get it over the wall.

NoteBook

The weather came full circle on the Cardinal season. At 54 degrees, the last game of the season was the coldest Cardinal game since a May 4 game played in Kansa City – a 10-0 Cardinal win that was also played in 54-degree weather. The last home game that was this cold was the second game of the season, April 9. It was 53 degrees for the 6-2 win over Pittsburgh that day.