Football

When the rest of your defense is playing man coverage, and one cornerback decides to play zone, bad things can happen.  By the time there were eleven minutes and forty seconds left in this season’s first playoff game, a lot of bad things had already happened to the Seattle Seahawks – who found themselves trailing the San Francisco 49ers by a 31-17 score.  Now, needing a stop to give themselves a chance to get back in the game, a final mistake would provide the dagger that would finish off their season.

The 49ers, on their own 26, faced a second-and-eight.  They lined up with two running backs (Kyle Juszczyk and Christian McCaffrey) stacked in an “I” formation behind quarterback Brock Purdy.  With their wide receivers Deebo Samuel and Brandon Aiyuk close to the rest of the formation (Aiyuk was just 6.3 yards outside of left tackle Trent Williams, and Samuel just 3.6 yards removed from tight end George Kittle on the other side) the formation suggested a run.  And, indeed, there would be a play-action element to the play, as Purdy feigned a pitch to McCaffrey running right before booting out to his left.

The Seahawks responded with man coverage, mostly pretty good.  Unshaken by the run fake, cornerback Tariq Woolen hung tight with Aiyuk as he curled upfield, and linebacker Tanner Muse rode underneath Kittle as he made his way over the middle.  But cornerback Michael Jackson – who had lined up over Samuel – had other ideas, as he dropped straight back into his zone, his every step taking him farther away from Deebo, who was his responsibility on the play.

For his part, Samuel ran a simple shallow cross, and when he found himself at about the first-down marker he looked up to find himself all alone.  When the ball arrived, the closest defender to Deebo was Muse, who was guarding Kittle, 8.9 yards away.  The man responsible for him (Jackson) was all the way on the other side of the field, 28.7 yards away.  As they do as well as any team in football, San Francisco’s other receivers immediately converted into blockers, shielding off the defenders who had been covering them and opening the left sideline for Deebo to complete the 74-yard catch-and-run touchdown that officially broke the game open and sent San Fran on its way to a 41-23 Wildcard conquest of the Seahawks (gamebook) (summary).

Wide open would be the theme of the day – especially the second half – for the now 14-4 49ers.

About three football minutes earlier, the 49ers – leading at that point 23-17 – faced second-and-goal from the seven-yard line.  Three San Francisco receivers (Aiyuk, Kittle and Samuel) curled their way deep into the left side of the end zone, bringing almost the entire Seattle defense with them.  This time the Hawks were in zone, but all the motion to the offensive left side broke down the discipline of the zone.  By the time Purdy threw the ball, all four defensive backs were in the end zone and to the left of the left-most hashmark.  This included Jackson, the right-side cornerback, who had responsibility for the deep right side.

As far as the receivers already in the end zone were concerned, the Seattle coverage was quite adequate.  The problems were the two receivers that the 49ers sent back the other way – running backs Juszczyk and Elijah Mitchell.  Responsible for the short outside zone to that side, linebacker Uchenna Nwosu saw Jusczcyk sprint out of the backfield and head up field toward the end zone.  Nwosu could also see that there was no one back there to defend Kyle, so he chased after him – making it impossible for him to cover Mitchell, who swung out to the right flat.  When the pass hit his hands, there was no defender within 15 yards of Mitchell.  Linebacker Muse, the closest defender at the time of the catch, who went in immediate pursuit, was still 7.2 yards away from Elijah as he crossed the goal line.

On yet another spectacular afternoon for San Francisco’s rookie quarterback, no fewer than 9 of his 18 completions were to wide-open receivers.  Along the way, the 49ers took advantage of almost every coverage mistake made by the Hawks. 

Additionally, Kyle Shanahan’s well-designed schemes repeatedly broke down the Seattle coverages.  Over and over they attacked Seattle’s single-high safety schemes with a simple combination.  The receiver lined wide to the right (frequently Ray-Ray McCloud) would streak up the sideline, carrying cornerback Jackson with him, and forcing safety Quandre Diggs to stay very deep and slide toward the right.  On the other side of the formation, the other outside receiver (frequently Aiyuk) would run a vertical stem against Woolen (who always believed he had inside help, and always played with outside technique).  After achieving a sufficient depth, Aiyuk would break back over the middle for a virtually uncontested catch.  Brandon finished the afternoon with three catches.  All three came on this exact play, and accounted for 73 yards.

Starting his first playoff game, Brock was slightly shaky in the early going, but settled down as the game went along.  He finished an unremarkable first half completing just 9 of 19 passes (47.4%) for 147 yards and a touchdown.  He completed 9 of 11 in the second half (81.8%), his 9 completions accounting for 185 yards and 2 more touchdowns.  His passer rating for the first half was an OK 91.3.  His second-half rating reached the maximum score that the system allows – 158.3.  By the final gun, Brock had thrown for 332 yards and three touchdowns.  He averaged 11.07 yards per pass attempt, and 18.44 per completion.  He finished with another stellar rating of 131.5.

Brock has now started six games as the 49er quarterback – all victories.  In his six games, he has yet to record a passer rating below 95.4, and has been below 114.6 just once.  San Francisco has scored at least 35 points in five of the six.

Irrelevant?

The “Mr. Irrelevant” joke has been around for decades, and used to be far more meaningful.  In the 1976 draft, for instance, Mr. Irrelevant was a wide receiver from Dayton named Kelvin Kirk.  He was the last pick of the seventeenth round that year – the 487^th player drafted.  Purdy, by contrast, although the last player taken in this year’s draft, was only the 262^nd player taken in the shortened draft (now just seven rounds).  Irrelevant or not, Brock’s success is more evidence that draft status isn’t a compelling indicator of a quarterback’s potential.  Much has been made of the fact that Tom Brady was a sixth-round draft pick.  As the 199^th player chosen in 2000, Tom was just the seventh quarterback taken behind Chad Pennington, Giovanni Carmazzi, Chris Redman, Tee Martin, Marc Bulger and Spergon Wynn – taken by Cleveland just 12 picks before Brady.

San Francisco fans will also recall that Joe Montana wasn’t selected until the third round.  Eighty-one players, three of them quarterbacks (Jack Thompson, Phil Simms and Steve Fuller) were believed to be better gambles than Montana.

This is not to suggest that Brock’s career will necessarily rival those of Brady and Montana.  It does suggest that a lot of times a passer’s intangibles are more important than the physical talents that can be weighed and measured.

So How Good Is He?

Brock’s contributions to the 49ers’ recent success can’t’ really be considered in a vacuum.  In many ways, his circumstances are truly enviable, considering the team and the coaching staff that surround him.  And make no mistake, the 49ers do a lot of good things that makes Purdy’s job easier.

First of all, they run the ball vigorously.  In all six of his starts, San Fran has racked up at least 153 rushing yards and averaged at least 4.6 yards per rush.  In the second half of the Seattle game, the 49ers ran the ball 23 times – on their way to 33 rushes for 181 yards for the game.  In addition to being productive, this is a very physical running attack.  Against the Hawks, 93 of the 165 rushing yards earned by the running backs came after contact – 3.21 after-contact yards on every carry.  It’s a running attack designed to take a toll on opposing defenses.

This aspect of the San Fran offense could take on even more importance this week.  Dallas (their next opponent) has had difficulties all season stopping physical running games.

The impact of the running game on the passing game can hardly be overstated.  First of all, teams with this kind of run commitment demand simple pass defenses.  More than just that, a pounding run game takes the legs out of the pass rush.  Seattle sacked Brock just once, and only hit him two other times.  This kind of protection was largely responsible for Purdy’s ability to exploit the breakdowns in Seattle’s deep secondary.

But none of this means that Purdy is just a game-manager, or along for the ride.  While he is certainly the beneficiary of playing with a great team, his contributions to that greatness are significant.  Even as he has profited from the protection of his offensive line, Brock has made their job easier.

Purdy doesn’t hold the ball.  As soon as he senses the line begin to struggle, he finds somewhere to go with the ball.  This might be the most mature part of Purdy’s game, the quickness and accuracy of his decision-making.  He rapidly recognizes gaffes in coverage, and almost unerringly goes to the right place with the ball.

Brock’s best throw last Saturday might not have been any of his twenty-yard tosses, but might have been a simple RPO (football code for run-pass-option).

There is 10:28 left in the second quarter, San Francisco nursing a 10-7 lead.  They face a first-and-ten on the Seahawk 27.  As happened a few times during the game, the Seattle defense over-reacted to play-action – another thing that happens when teams run the ball a lot.  On this play, the run-action went to Purdy’s left, and the entire defense jumped at it – especially linebacker Alexander Johnson.  Johnson would have had the short-underneath zone to the right side.  But the second that Johnson abandoned his zone, Purdy immediately spun around darted and a pass to McCaffrey.  It was one of the few tight-window throws that Brock was called on to make, and he threw it right on the mark, just beyond the fingertips of Nwuso.

This is high-level quarterback play, and evidence of a young player contributing as mush to the team’s success as the team is contributing to his.  It all makes this San Francisco team a dangerous opponent.

So How Do You Approach Them?

The secret to beating San Francisco has eluded NFL teams for eleven straight weeks, now.  But even though they lost by 18 points, something of Seattle’s approach might be worth trying again by Dallas or some other future opponent.  Seattle did carry a 17-16 lead into halftime.

The thing they did right in the first half was they ran the ball.  Considering that the 49er defense finished second in the NFL in run defense, both for yards per game (77.7) and yards per rush (3.4), this might seem to be a counter-intuitive approach.  But here’s the logic:

First of all, where you don’t want to be against this defense is third and long.  A committed running attack – something not many teams have had the courage to employ against the 49ers – would keep your offense in manageable situations, wear down their defense – instead of letting them wear down yours – and keep that offense on the sidelines.  Things worked out almost exactly that way for Seattle in the first half.  They ran the ball 20 times for an impressive 82 yards, and controlled the clock for 16:53 of the half.  With that kind of ground support, Seattle quarterback Geno Smith enjoyed a fine first half, completing 9 of 10 throws for 104 yards and a touchdown.

I’m sure that they intended to carry that strategy over to the second half, but the 49ers’ running game got there first.

Trailing still by a point, San Francisco took the opening kickoff and marched methodically down the field.  Thirteen plays and 7:45 later, his teammates pushed Purdy over the goal line, and the 49ers had the lead.  The Seahawks mounted a response, moving 55 yards in 12 plays in a subsequent drive that absorbed the next 4:50 of game time.  But with the ball on the San Francisco 19-yard line, defensive lineman Charles Omenihu made the play that would change the season for both teams.

Reacting to outside pressure, Smith tried to step up in the pocket.  As he rushed past the Seattle quarterback, Omenihu reached out and slapped the ball out of Geno’s grasp.  The ball rolled behind Seahawk tackle Charles Cross, who noticed it too late.  Before he could react to the ball, San Francisco’s star defensive end Nick Bosa was on top of it.

Seven plays and 3:23 later, Mitchell was in the end zone.  When Seattle got the ball back for just their second possession of the half, there was only 14:02 left in the contest, they were down by 14 points and decided that they couldn’t afford to run the ball any longer.  After running 20 times for 82 yards in the first half, Seattle only ran the ball 5 times in the second half as the game spun away from them.

But while things didn’t work out for Seattle, that doesn’t mean that Dallas won’t have better success trying the same thing.  In fact, the more I think about this game, The more I think that both teams might embrace run-first game plans.

Both defenses feature dangerous pass rushers, so both offenses will want to stay out of third-and-long situations.  Both offenses take great pride in their running games.  Further, both offenses will appreciate the value of keeping the other offense off the field.  There are ample reasons for each team to test the other on the ground before they deploy their passing attacks.

The greatest difference is that San Francisco has fielded one of football’s best run defenses this season, while the Cowboys have been frequently damaged by opposing running attacks.  A trip to the Championship Game could well ride on which of these defenses can bring a halt to the other team’s running game.