Right tackle Billy Turner was engaged with his pass block on Chicago’s Bilal Nichols, and probably wasn’t even aware of the corner rush. Aaron Rodgers – Green Bay’s legendary quarterback – stood alone in an empty backfield. There was no back hanging with him. So when Duke Shelley came off the corner, there was no one to pick him up. He came as a free rusher on the Packer quarterback.
It didn’t matter.
One step before Shelly reached Rodgers, Aaron lofted the football up the field.
Green Bay lined up with three receivers to Aaron’s right and two to his left – the side that Shelley would come from. The Bears were in cover four, with the two non-rushing cornerbacks and the two safeties each taking a deep fourth of the field.
Davante Adams (who was to the left of Rodgers) and Allen Lazard (to the right) went about ten yards up field and turned around. As they did, the two defenders responsible for the deep middle of the field stopped with them – Tashaun Gipson hovering over Adams, and Eddie Jackson ready to deny any pass in Lazard’s direction.
This was all well and good, except for one thing. The most inside receiver on the three-receiver side – Marquez Valdes-Scantling – didn’t stop. He exploded into the gaping void that the deep middle had now become. Of course, that was where Aaron had directed the football, and Valdes-Scantling – with linebacker Danny Trevathan in futile chase – gathered the ball in and sprinted the final 42 yards into the end zone.
That touchdown, coming with 8:31 left in the first half, gave the Packers their first lead of the game (14-10), and as such served as a kind of turning point in the contest – an eventual 35-16 Green Bay victory (gamebook) (summary). It was also a singular occurrence – an aberration, if you will, weighed against the rest of the game – even as it revealed two recurring issues that did much to define the outcome.
First the singularity.
That 72-yard touchdown was the only play of 20 yards or more that Green Bay executed the entire game. (One small caveat here. Early in the third quarter, Valdes-Scantling found himself behind the defense again – in almost the same area of the field – for what would have been a 53-yard touchdown, but he dropped Rodgers perfectly thrown pass.)
This speaks directly to the defensive game-plan developed by coach Matt Nagy and defensive coordinator Chuck Pagano.
Playing the Packers twice a year, Chicago is very familiar with Aaron Rodgers. Over the course of his 16-year career, Rodgers is now 20-5 against the Bears with a 107.2 passer rating against them. The 4 touchdown passes he tossed against them on Sunday bring him to 55 in 25 career games against Chicago – his most against any team. Clearly, in this case, familiarity breeds more contempt than success for Chicago. In his two victories against them this year, Aaron completed 40 of 53 passes (75.5%) for 451 yards and 8 touchdowns with no interceptions.
This time around, the Chicago brain-trust devised a complimentary-football approach that came closer to working than the score indicates. With the offense controlling the clock and keeping Rodgers on the sidelines, the defense set up with their two deep safeties (Gipson and Jackson). Chicago rarely blitzes anyway – at 29.5% they have football’s fourth-lowest blitz percentage. In this game, they blitzed even less – coming after Rodgers just 4 times.
They did a lot of faux-blitzing where a linebacker (like Khalil Mack) would join the rush with a lineman dropping out in coverage. The corner rush on the touchdown pass was such a ploy, as Akiem Hicks dropped out of the rush into a short middle zone.
It was almost always four rushers, but not necessarily the four down linemen rushing.
The intent of the whole plan was to steal a few possessions of game time and prevent the big play at all cost. If the Packers were going to score, they were going to have to do it with a series of long drives.
The concept was more successful than not. The Packers had only 7 possessions for the game. Apart from the long touchdown pass, Green Bay was only able to put together two touchdown “drives,” one of 80 yards and the other of 76 yards. In the end, the Pack was held to just 44 offensive plays and 316 total yards. The difference in what would have been a razor-close 21-16 game and the 35-16 decisive loss was two short field touchdowns Green Bay scored after turnovers by the Chicago offense. Green Bay recovered a fumble on the Bear 22 about midway through the second quarter, and returned an interception to the Chicago 26 late in the fourth.
Almost always in Chicago these days, it comes back to the offense.
The Offense Giveth and the Offense Taketh Away
As damaging as the turnovers were, it would be a disservice to present them as the offense’s only impact on the game. The Bears ran the ball with more commitment than most would have expected. Thirty-one running plays took their toll on a Green Bay defense that endured 74 plays and 35 minutes and 29 seconds of ball possession. Against that, quarterback Mitchell Trubisky completed 78.6 percent of his passes (33 of 42) – albeit for only 252 yards (7.64 per completion) as the Bears picked at Green Bay’s underneath coverages.
Only 7 of Mitch’s 42 passes were more than 10 yards from scrimmage. Not very cinematic, but it kept the chains moving. Chicago backed a solid 6-for-15 showing on third down with a surprising 5-for-6 on fourth down. They put 356 yards and 21 first downs on the Green Bay defense.
But, the one fourth down they missed came at a critical junction of the game, they finished just 1-for-5 in the Red Zone – and there were the two turnovers.
The main takeaway here is that the gap between the 8-8 Bears (who will go into the playoffs as the seventh seed) and the 13-3 Packers (who will enjoy a bye and the conference’s top seed) lies – for the most part – in Chicago’s inability to limit their mistakes. That being said, there were two other recurring issues that inform the playoff trajectories of both of these teams.
The Valdes-Scantling touchdown was one of several examples of soft play from the Chicago secondary. Here, both safeties dropped coverage on Marquez’ vertical. In other instances, it was a mental error or a simple failure to adjust the defensive design to the demands of the coverage.
With 4:37 left in a still close (21-16) game, and Green Bay facing a second-and-nine from the Chicago 18-yard line, the Bears deployed in man coverage (after playing mostly zone early, they went more-and-more to man defenses as the game progressed). Well, everyone was in man except for slot corner Shelley. As Allen Lazard ran a shallow cross, Shelley – who should have had him in coverage – dropped into a zone, curling away from the receiver that was his responsibility. Seeing Lazard uncovered, linebacker Josh Woods tried to run with him, and was able to catch him from behind – but not until Allen gained 14 yards on the catch-and-run. Green Bay scored a touchdown on the next play.
With 5:40 left in the first half, Green Bay faced third-and-four on the Chicago 16. With Adams in the slot to the right, he was the responsibility of slot-corner Shelley, who played with outside leverage on Davante, knowing he had safety help inside. But that safety (Gipson) was 15 yards off the line (remember, this was third-and-four), so all Adams had to do was curl to the inside of Shelley and he was sufficiently open to catch the pass for the first down.
Green Bay would go on to score the touchdown that would give them the 21-13 halftime lead. Every time that the Bears’ secondary mistakes let Green Bay off the hook, the Packers put the ball in the end zone. Every. Single. Time.
Three plays earlier, Chicago came with one of their rare blitzes, bringing Jackson from Aaron’s left and playing man behind it. Problem was that Green Bay lined up two tight ends (Marcedes Lewis and Dominique Dafney) to the right, where there was only one defender (Shelley, again) to cover both.
At the snap, Dafney ran an inside route and Shelley went with him. After chipping on end Robert Quinn. Lewis rolled out into the flat where he was all alone. That would have been an 11-yard pickup, but the gain was nullified when Adams pushed Shelley in the back.
These were the most glaring errors. But the secondary play in general was soft and more than a little tentative. They successfully limited the big play. Davante Adams never had a completion over 9 yards, but he caught 6 passes for 46 yards – with four of the six going for first downs (including a touchdown).
For his part, Rodgers had only 4 completions on passes more than 10 yards downfield, but he completed 15 of 16 short passes. He also worked over the middle of the field – mostly exploiting the safeties. In passes to the middle of the field, Aaron was 8-for-9 for 148 yards and 2 touchdowns.
This is a potentially critical issue for Chicago. Against New Orleans (their WildCard opponent) soft play in the secondary will almost certainly prove fatal. So too, by the way, will turnovers and red zone failures.
A Step Too Late
Referring a final time to the touchdown pass that we began with, the final element to consider is Shelley’s pass rush – just one step too slow.
For a quarterback who was only sacked once, and only blitzed four times, Aaron Rodgers found himself under a substantial amount of pressure. For all that he only threw 24 passes, there were a good handful of rushers who came free or nearly free. In nearly all cases, they were a step too late. With his veteran’s understanding of defenses and his absolute command of all of the pieces of his offense, Aaron’s ability to diagnose where the ball should go and the quickness he displayed in getting it out of his hands was as determining a factor in the victory as any of the other items listed here.
Aaron converted a third-and-eight in the first quarter on a check-down to Aaron Jones just as Robert Quinn was bringing him to the ground. On the pass to Lewis referred to earlier, Jackson came free on the blitz, but he couldn’t get there in time. In similar fashion, Hicks came free on a stunt on the third-down throw to Adams noted above. He converted a second-and-six to Robert Tonyan in the third quarter with Quinn rushing up on him from behind. Again, not in time. The 14-yard pass to Lazard with 4:37 left in the game also came with Quinn (who was unblocked on the play) in his face.
For the afternoon, Rodgers was 9 for 10 for 154 yards and 2 touchdowns when the ball was out of his hands in less than 2.5 seconds.
This is the bind that a defense finds itself in against the elite quarterbacks – and right now Mr. Rodgers is playing at as high a level as anyone in the business – a circumstance that bodes well for the Packers in the upcoming tournament.